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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Edward Mitchell, a prisoner in the custody of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from an order denying 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254.  See Mitchell v. Walsh, No. 1:09-cv-02548, 2017 WL 
3725503 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2017).  Mitchell currently is 
serving a sentence of life imprisonment following his 
convictions at a joint trial with Karim Eley and Lester Eiland in 
a Pennsylvania state court in 2001 for various offenses arising 
from a robbery and a murder.  Mitchell seeks relief on the 
grounds that the admission at the trial of testimony of jailhouse 
informants setting forth his co-defendant Lester Eiland’s out-of-
court jailhouse statements violated his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  The District 
Court in the habeas corpus proceedings concluded that Eiland’s 
statements to the informants were nontestimonial as recognized 
by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354 
(2004), and therefore their inclusion in testimony at the trial did 
not violate his Confrontation Clause rights even though he could 
not cross-examine Eiland regarding the statements. 
Mitchell has argued and continues to argue that the 
District Court erred by applying Crawford because the AEDPA 
requires assessment of whether a state court’s decision was 
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and the 
Supreme Court decided Crawford on March 8, 2004, after his 
trial and after the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his 
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conviction on direct appeal on September 22, 2003, in the last 
state court proceeding dealing with the Sixth Amendment issue. 
 Consequently, he points out that the Crawford principles were 
not “clearly established” at the time the state courts were 
considering the Sixth Amendment issue.  Mitchell contends that 
even if admission of the challenged statements would not create 
a Confrontation Clause issue in a trial held today, he is entitled 
to habeas corpus relief because, prior to Crawford, when his 
case was being tried and was on direct appeal, the Confrontation 
Clause would have been applied to bar the jailhouse testimony 
with respect to Eiland’s statements. 
We have concluded that Mitchell, by focusing narrowly 
on the “clearly established Federal law” language of 28 U.S.C. 
2254(d)(1) and by relying on the law in effect at the time of his 
trial and appeal, misstates the standard applicable to habeas 
corpus review of a state court conviction in the federal courts.  
Congress in section 2254(d) has made it a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for granting habeas corpus relief to a state 
prisoner that a state court’s decision leading to his custody was 
contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established federal 
law at the time that the state court made its decision.  But even if 
a petitioner in state custody makes that showing he has satisfied 
only one requirement for the granting of his petition because the 
AEDPA allows relief to be granted “only on the ground that [a 
prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis 
added).  Accordingly, notwithstanding a state court’s 
misapplication of federal law at trial a prisoner is not necessarily 
entitled to relief in the light of “the longstanding rule that 
federal courts will not entertain habeas petitions to correct errors 
that do not undermine the lawfulness of a petitioner’s 
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detention.”  Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 724 (3d Cir. 
2005).  For the reasons we set forth below, we conclude that 
Mitchell is not in custody pursuant to what is now recognized as 
a violation of the Sixth Amendment attributable to the testimony 
at the trial of the jailhouse informants which set forth Eiland’s 
statements and therefore we will affirm the order of August 29, 
2017, denying Mitchell’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 On August 10, 2001, at the joint trial of Mitchell and his 
two co-defendants, Eley and Eiland, a jury convicted Mitchell of 
second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit 
robbery in the July 2000 shooting death of Angel DeJesus, a taxi 
driver, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell, No. 782-2014, 2015 WL 7726738, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 12, 2015).  Prior to the trial, Mitchell and Eley filed 
unsuccessful motions to have their cases severed from those of 
the other defendants and thus the trial was of all three 
defendants.  
 
After extensive but ultimately unsuccessful state court 
proceedings, Mitchell filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
in the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 28, 
2009, which he amended on October 19, 2010.1  Mitchell’s 
amended petition advanced three grounds for relief:  (1) the state 
trial court’s charge on reasonable doubt was constitutionally 
defective; (2) the introduction of the informants’ testimony 
                                                 
1 The federal habeas corpus proceedings were prolonged by 
orders staying proceedings on Mitchell’s petition while his state 
post-conviction relief applications were pending.   
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describing non-testifying co-defendant Eiland’s out-of-court 
statements violated Mitchell’s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause; and (3) the trial court deprived Mitchell of due process 
of law when it denied his claim of actual innocence.  At this 
time, however, Mitchell limits his claim to the Confrontation 
Clause issue and thus we do not address the other issues he set 
forth in his petition. 
 
Mitchell argues that the testimony at the trial of two 
jailhouse informants, Matthew LeVan and Steven Taylor, 
violated his constitutional rights because they testified as to 
Eiland’s out-of-court statements that implicated Mitchell in the 
offenses and Mitchell did not have the opportunity to confront 
Eiland regarding those statements.  Though Eiland’s statements 
did not mention Mitchell by name, Mitchell contends that in the 
context of the joint trial Eiland’s statements implicated him in 
the robbery and murder.  Specifically, LeVan testified as 
follows: 
Q.  Now, if you can, describe for the jury the 
conversation you had with Lester Eiland while 
you were in the jail cell playing cards. 
A.  He said about the sawed-off shotgun was used 
and a .380 pistol, and there was two other guns 
used and one was hidden in a brick close to where 
it happened at. 
Q.  Did he say what kind of crime it was? 
A.  Homicide 
Q.  Or began as? 
A.  Homicide—no, it was a robbery. 
Q.  Did he say what happened? 
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A.  He said they—they, as in whoever was with 
him—he didn't say the names of those people—
when he went up to them, it was supposed to be a 
robbery, and he was—he’s the one that shot him, 
but he didn't mean to do it.  It was the other two's 
idea or something like that, in that sense. 
 
App. 225. 
Taylor testified, referring to the substance of Eiland’s 
statements, that “they were there to rob a cab driver, and 
I guess with different things you did or whatnot during 
the evening, somewhere, somehow, something went 
wrong and whatnot.  Somebody ended up dead from 
that.”  App. 239.   
Mitchell claims that these jailhouse witnesses’ references 
to “they” and the murder being “the other two’s idea” tied him 
to the robbery and provided key evidence to establish his 
culpability for the offenses.  Mitchell argues that the failure to 
exclude or properly redact the references to his involvement in 
the offenses from the co-defendant’s statements to which the 
informants referred violated his confrontation rights as 
recognized in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 
1620 (1968), Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 
1702 (1987), and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 
1151 (1998).  He unsuccessfully raised this claim on direct 
appeal in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania where he also 
unsuccessfully challenged the trial court’s order denying his 
pretrial motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants.  
See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, No. 1658 MDA 2001, slip op. 
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at 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2003).2 
Mitchell understandably relies on our decision in Eley v. 
Erickson, 712 F.3d 837 (3d Cir. 2013), in which we granted 
habeas corpus relief to his co-defendant, Kariem Eley, whom the 
jury also convicted at the joint trial.  We granted Eley’s petition 
because we believed that there had been a Bruton violation in 
his case by reason of the admission of testimony describing 
Eiland’s statements at the trial.  In Eley, we held that the state 
court’s order denying a motion to sever the trials was contrary to 
federal law clearly established by Bruton, Richardson, and Gray, 
Supreme Court’s precedent on the Confrontation Clause.  712 
F.3d at 859.  Focusing in particular on Eiland’s statement that it 
was “the other two” defendants who had the “idea” to rob the 
victim, in Eley we explained: 
Although we are mindful of the deference 
that we owe to the Commonwealth’s courts, we 
are constrained to conclude that fairminded jurists 
could not disagree that the Superior Court’s 
decision is inconsistent with Richardson and 
Gray. We have no doubt that the jury inferred, on 
the basis of Eiland’s confession alone, that Eley 
was one of ‘the other two’ whose ‘idea’ it was to 
rob DeJesus. . . . Indeed, a juror who wondered to 
whom ‘the other two’ referred . . . ‘need[ed] only 
                                                 
2  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Mitchell’s petition 
for review of the Superior Court decision on June 29, 2014.  The 
Pennsylvania courts subsequently have denied four separate 
petitions for post-conviction relief that Mitchell has filed.  But 
none of the state post-conviction proceedings addressed the 
Confrontation Clause issue presented here. 
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lift his eyes to [Eley and Mitchell], sitting at 
counsel table, to find what ... seem[ed] the 
obvious answer,’ Gray, 523 U.S. at 193, 118 S.Ct. 
1151. 
Id. at 859 (alterations in original). 
Mitchell has argued in these habeas corpus proceedings that our 
holding in Eley that the introduction of testimony making 
reference to Eiland’s statements was unconstitutional applies 
with the same force here and therefore on that basis he is 
entitled to habeas corpus relief. 
The District Court referred Mitchell’s petition to a 
magistrate judge for a report and recommendation which she 
issued on December 12, 2016, recommending that the Court 
deny Mitchell’s petition.  Mitchell filed objections to the report 
and recommendation but the Court overruled the objections by 
adopting the report and recommendation on August 29, 2017, in 
a memorandum opinion.  The Court concluded that, even 
assuming Mitchell could make the threshold showing under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) that the state court’s denial of his 
Confrontation Clause claim was “contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” 
under Bruton, he was not entitled to relief because the Sixth 
Amendment law had evolved in Crawford after his trial and 
there had not been a Confrontation Clause violation under the 
updated standards.3   
                                                 
3 The Commonwealth initially argued that Mitchell had not 
exhausted his Confrontation Clause claim in the state courts, as 
required to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  However, by the 
time the magistrate judge had made her report and 
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The germane development of the law in Crawford was 
that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause was recognized 
as guarding against testimonial statements made by an 
individual in anticipation that the person to whom he makes the 
statements will be called as a witness as well as formal 
statements made under oath and statements made to law 
enforcement officers seeking information about past events.  
After the District Court denied his petition, Mitchell, to whom 
that Court granted a certificate of appealability, filed this timely 
appeal challenging the application of Crawford to his 
Confrontation Clause claim. 
 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Mitchell’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 
2241.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the denial of 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253.  Inasmuch as the Court did not hold an 
evidentiary hearing on Mitchell’s petition, our review is plenary. 
 Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 The AEDPA imposes a “highly deferential standard” on 
federal habeas corpus review of state court proceedings.  That 
standard “demands that [such] decisions be given the benefit of 
                                                                                                             
recommendation, the Commonwealth had conceded that the 
exhaustion requirement had been satisfied with respect to the 
Confrontation Clause claim and that the claim was therefore not 
procedurally defaulted.  See App. 961, 979. 
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the doubt.”  Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 
1862 (2010).  A federal court cannot grant habeas relief based 
on a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in a state court 
unless that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States” or “was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 
As was the District Court, we are satisfied that Mitchell 
established that the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in the last state 
court decision to address the Sixth Amendment issue, 
unreasonably applied what was then clearly established federal 
law when it upheld the trial court’s ruling refusing to sever 
Mitchell’s trial from that of the other defendants before 
admitting the testimony referencing Eiland’s out-of-court 
statements that implicated Mitchell in the offenses.  Indeed, in 
Eley we considered these statements and their effect on Eley, 
who was in Mitchell’s position, and concluded that the 
admission of the statements violated the Confrontation Clause 
and that the error “substantially influenced the jury’s verdict.”  
Eley, 712 F.3d at 861 (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129, 88 S.Ct. at 
1624).  Thus the admission of the testimony was not a small 
matter.  But the question that we now must address is different 
for it is whether the District Court in considering the habeas 
corpus petition correctly considered case law authority 
subsequent to that on which we relied in Eley in considering 
whether Mitchell was “in custody in violation of the 
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Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(a).  That recent authority is Crawford and our 
decision in United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 
2012), in neither of which we discussed Eley. 
 There is no doubt but that if a habeas corpus petitioner 
shows that a state court decision leading to his custody was 
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), he often will 
be entitled to relief, though not “always and automatically.”  
Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838, 853 (7th Cir. 2012).  While it 
is necessary for a state prisoner to satisfy § 2254(d) to make a 
successful habeas corpus claim, he cannot obtain habeas corpus 
relief unless he also makes a showing under § 2254(a) that he is 
being held in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.  Id.  “[Section] 2254 relief thus is 
available only to state prisoners who currently are being held in 
violation of an existing constitutional right, not to inmates who 
at one point might have been able to show that [under] a since-
overruled Supreme Court or lower court precedent [they] would 
have [been entitled to] relief.”  Desai v. Booker, 538 F.3d 424, 
428 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Dennis v. Sec’y, Pennsylvania 
Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 349 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (Jordan, J., 
concurring) (explaining importance of “understand[ing] the 
interplay between §§ 2254(a) and 2254(d)”). 
This case involves the evolution of the law inasmuch as 
regardless of what happened at his trial or the state of the law at 
that time, Mitchell is unable to show that he is being held in 
violation of an existing right by reason of the informants’ 
testimony.  In Crawford, the Supreme Court explained that the 
“primary object” of the Confrontation Clause is to protect 
defendants from testimonial hearsay, including statements taken 
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by law enforcement from witnesses against the accused.  541 
U.S. at 53, 124 S. Ct. at 1365.  We have made clear that the 
Supreme Court, building on Crawford, has gone on to hold “that 
the Confrontation Clause protects the defendant only against the 
introduction of testimonial hearsay statements, and that 
admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay is governed solely by the 
rules of evidence.”  Berrios, 676 F.3d at 126 (emphasis in 
original) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823–24, 
126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006), Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 
352-53, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1152–53 (2011), and Whorton v. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419–20, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1182-83 
(2007)).   
In Berrios, we declined to apply the Confrontation Clause 
to bar introduction of jailhouse testimony not unlike the 
testimony with respect to Eiland’s statements involved in this 
case because in light of the developing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence we indicated that “where nontestimonial hearsay 
is concerned, the Confrontation Clause has no role to play in 
determining the admissibility of a declarant’s statement.”  676 
F.3d at 126.4  Though in some circumstances it might not be 
                                                 
4  Mitchell argues that application of Crawford and its progeny 
to his petition violates the antiretroactivity principles of Teague 
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989).  But  Teague does 
not affect our analysis for two reasons:  First, Mitchell has not 
challenged the District Court’s observation that Crawford was 
decided before his conviction became final for purposes of a 
Teague analysis, and thus it would not be necessary to apply 
Crawford retroactively to consider its impact on his 
Confrontation Clause claim.  See Mitchell, 2017 WL 3725503, 
at *5.  Second, Teague bars application of new rules of criminal 
procedure to collaterally attack convictions in state courts, but 
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clear if a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial for Crawford 
purposes this is not such a case because Mitchell concedes, 
correctly, that Eiland’s statements were not testimonial. 
Berrios and the Supreme Court precedent on which it 
relies foreclose Mitchell’s claim for relief.  Even if Mitchell 
shows that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision affirming 
his conviction was contrary to what was clearly established 
Federal law at the time the court made the decision, that 
showing alone would not entitle him to habeas corpus relief 
because he also must show that his confinement violates the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(a), a determination that takes into account all relevant 
precedent.  In this regard, notwithstanding Eley we are obliged 
to consider Crawford because it is a relevant precedent and the 
respondent squarely has raised the case even though we did not 
                                                                                                             
has no relevance where consideration of a new rule leads to 
rejection of a habeas corpus claim.  In such a case, considering 
the new rule and refusing to upend a conviction based on prior 
standards serves the very aims of finality and repose that the 
Teague rule safeguards.  See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 
373, 113 S. Ct. 838, 844 (1993); Flamer v. State of Del., 68 F.3d 
710, 725 n.14 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Teague only applies to a change 
in the law that favors criminal defendants.”) (emphasis in 
original).  Cf. United States v. Peppers, 2018 WL 382713, at 
*13 (3d Cir., Aug. 13, 2018) (holding that, for purposes of 
applying the categorical approach to assess prior convictions, 
post-sentencing Supreme Court precedent explaining the Armed 
Career Criminal Act can be considered once an applicant for 
post-conviction relief has satisfied the gatekeeping requirements 
of AEDPA codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)). 
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discuss Crawford when we granted relief to Eley.5   
It is appropriate to rely on current constitutional standards 
in evaluating a habeas corpus petition because, “as a practical 
matter, correcting violations of extant constitutional standards is 
all that the statute ever could meaningfully require of a state – 
at least when it comes to a constitutional challenge to the 
admission of evidence.”  Desai, 538 F.3d at 428.  It would be 
anomalous to grant habeas corpus relief to Mitchell because of 
the introduction of evidence that would be admissible under 
current constitutional standards at a retrial notwithstanding the 
previous Confrontation Clause error.  After all, if we granted the 
petition we would do so subject to the condition that the 
prosecution at its option could retry Mitchell.  See Eley, 712 
F.3d at 862.6   
V.  CONCLUSION 
We sum up by saying that inasmuch as under Crawford, 
there was not a violation of the Confrontation Clause due to the 
admission of the informants’ testimony with respect to Eiland’s 
statements Mitchell is not being held in custody in violation of 
                                                 
5  In similar circumstances, we already have noted that Eley is 
not dispositive of whether Crawford applies to bar relief because 
“the parties in Eley did not mention, and the Eley Court did not 
consider or rule on, the Crawford issue.”  Waller v. Varano, 562 
F. App’x  91, 95 n.5 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
6 Sometimes when habeas corpus relief is granted it may not be 
permissible to retry the petitioner.  But we see no reason why if 
we were reversing on the Confrontation Clause issue the case 
would come within that category.  See Burks v. United States, 
437 U.S. 1, 16-18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150-51 (1978). 
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the Constitution laws, or treaties of the United States and 
accordingly he is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.  
Therefore, we will affirm the order entered on August 29, 2017, 
denying Mitchell’s petition for habeas corpus. 
 
 
 
